TL;DR: No, password are stored as hashes which can (in general) not be recovered.
Linux doesn't store plain-text passwords anywhere by default. They are hashed or otherwise encrypted through a variety of algorithms. So, in general, no, this isn't possible with stored data.
If you have passwords stored somewhere other than the /etc/passwd
database, they may be stored in a way that allows this. htpasswd
files can contain wealy encrypted passwords, and other applications may store weaker hashes or plain text passwords for various (typically bad) reasons.
Also, user configuration files may contain unencrypted passwords or weakly protected passwords for various reasons - fetchmail grabbing content from another service, .netrc
, or simple automated things may include the password.
If the passwords are hashed or encrypted with an older, weak algorithm (3DES, MD5) it would be possible to work out reasonably efficiently / cheaply what the password was - albeit through attacking the data rather than just reversing the transformation. (eg: things like http://project-rainbowcrack.com/ or http://www.openwall.com/john/)
Since you are root it is also possible to attack the user password at another level - replace the login binary, or sudo, or part of PAM, etc, with something that will capture the password when it is entered.
So, in specific, no, but in general having root access does make it easier to get at the users details through various side-channels.
I think this is not feasible.
As @Eir Nym says, you fairly obviously can't translate, for example,
an MD5-hash of a password into a SHA-256 hash, without knowing the
password.
However you would think that you'd be able to translate a SHA-256
hash (according to crypt(3)) into a SHA-256 hash (according to
OpenLDAP): surely it's just a matter of identifying the salt and hash
in one format, and reordering them into the format the other expects.
No? What, it's not?!
In OpenLDAP, the format of the userPassword
attribute, though not
quite documented, is relatively straightforward: it's the fixed-length
hash of the password followed by the salt (see eg
contrib/slapd-modules/passwd/sha2
in the OpenLDAP
sources). This is also evident in notes such as this OpenLDAP FAQ-o-matic article which shows how to generate a {SSHA}
hash from password + salt.
For systems which use crypt(3), however, you'll see ‘password hashes’
of the form
$id$salt$hash
where $5$
indicates SHA-256, $6$
indicates SHA-512, and so on. The
hash
element of that is the base64 encoded form of some
function of key, salt, and (in some variants) number of encryption
rounds, but the actual function is... not documented.
- The Wikipedia page on crypt(3)
mentions that ‘Over time various algorithms have been introduced.’
- It points to the ‘Password Hashing
Competition’
specification (PHC), which narrows down the gross format of the ‘hash’
string, but not as much as you'd hope. It doesn't even
conclusively identify what base64 variant the string uses (it
appears to, but acknowledges that characters
[.-]
can appear in
a base64 string without saying what they are).
- The passlib
library
acknowledges some of the mess (‘All of the above is guesswork
based on examination of existing hashes and OS implementations’)
and recommends the PHC format.
- A linuxquestions.org
question
indicates that the relevant base64 encoding is peculiar.
So we can look at the glibc sources
for crypt. There, we discover (in crypt_util.c
) that the base64
alphabet is indeed odd, using "./0-9A-Za-b"
rather than the more
usual (and PHC-specified) "A-Za-z0-9+/"
(with occasional variants in
the last two characters). Not helpful, but we could cope if this were
the only difference.
However, the sha256-crypt.c
function in that library (for example)
takes the key and salt and does something very odd and long-winded
with them to produce the hash
value. I wouldn't presume to venture an
opinion on whether what it's doing is sensible, but it's certainly not
straightforward.
What that means is that although the crypt(3) $5$
and OpenLDAP ‘SHA-256’
hashes are on the face of it using the same cryptographic primitive,
they are actually using it in sufficiently different ways that they
amount to different hash functions so that, as with the point at the
top, you can't translate one to the other without knowing the
password. A similar point can be made about $6$
/SHA-512 passwords.
This is very annoying.
Parenthetical note: As it happens, it is possible to convert the $1$
/SMD5 ‘hashes’ between crypt(3) format and OpenLDAP:
$1$salt$hash
corresponds to
'{SMD5}' + hash + salt
where +
is simple string concatenation. But we probably shouldn't be using
MD5 hashes any more, so this doesn't much help.
Note also that you can port your crypt(3) hashes to OpenLDAP unchanged, using
{CRYPT}$1$salt$hash
if your libc is compatible (which it typically will be, if OpenLDAP is running on Linux), but OpenLDAP won't generate new passwords this way, so this is a one-way street.
Best Answer
There's a specialized tool for password weakness check: John the Ripper available and probably packaged in all common Unix & Linux flavours.
Here's an example of usage on Debian GNU/Linux 9 (unshadow comes along john). Some care should be taken when manipulating password files, this is just a PoC. Note that the john command could be run remotely (and thus not installed anywhere else than a dedicated system) as long as it's provided suitable password files.
Setup (including setting password foobar to account test):
Test for forbidden/default passwords:
Result:
Cleanup: