I don't know how the RemoteDesktopManager does it, but I assume it would be the same as how it stores it in a .RDP file.
CryptProtectData which (with the settings they used for RDP) only allows the string to be decrpyted on the same machine as the one that encrypted it due to the fact that it uses the unique ID of the the windows install as part of the encryption processes (the CRYPTPROTECT_LOCAL_MACHINE flag). So yes a attacker could decrypt your password, but they could only do it on the machine that stored the password, they can not do a "offline" attack.
Note this is all for .RDP
files. I have no way of knowing if Remote Desktop Manager does the same thing.
Short answer: No*
Passwords stored on your local machine can be decrypted by Chrome, as long as your OS user account is logged in. And then you can view those in plain text. At first this seems horrible, but how did you think auto-fill worked? When that password field gets filled in, Chrome must insert the real password into the HTML form element - or else the page wouldn't work right, and you could not submit the form. And if the connection to the website is not over HTTPS, the plain text is then sent over the internet. In other words, if chrome can't get the plain text passwords, then they are totally useless. A one way hash is no good, because we need to use them.
Now the passwords are in fact encrypted, the only way to get them back to plain text is to have the decryption key. That key is your Google password, or a secondary key you can set up. When you sign into Chrome and sync the Google servers will transmit the encrypted passwords, settings, bookmarks, auto-fill, etc, to your local machine. Here Chrome will decrypt the information and be able to use it.
On Google's end all that info is stored in its encrpyted state, and they do not have the key to decrypt it. Your account password is checked against a hash to log in to Google, and even if you let chrome remember it, that encrypted version is hidden in the same bundle as the other passwords, impossible to access. So an employee could probably grab a dump of the encrypted data, but it wouldn't do them any good, since they would have no way to use it.*
So no, Google employees can not** access your passwords, since they are encrypted on their servers.
* However, do not forget that any system that can be accessed by an authorized user can be accessed by an unauthorized user. Some systems are easier to break than other, but none are fail-proof. . . That being said, I think I will trust Google and the millions they spend on security systems, over any other password storage solution. And heck, I'm a wimpy nerd, it would be easier to beat the passwords out of me than break Google's encryption.
** I am also assuming that there isn't a person who just happens to work for Google gaining access to your local machine. In that case you are screwed, but employment at Google isn't actually a factor any more. Moral: Hit Win + L before leaving machine.
Best Answer
It's a security trade off rather than a security weakness. Due to the very nature of passwords, if they are stored in a way that they can be used (ie, to fill out a form), they are stored in a way that can be retrieved, no matter what scheme is used to store or encrypt them. Hiding the option to show the password doesn't change the fact the the application itself at some point has to retrieve it - and when it does so, it's subject to various methods of extracting it.
This sounds like a pretty gaping hole, until you consider the other factors at work.
In reality, the saved password is at about the same risk as a typed password against a determined attacker, since the determined attacker will be prepared for opportunities like an unlocked PC or unlocked office. With a little practice and advance preparation, a USB drive or website can be prepared to install a rootkit in under 15 seconds - less than the time it takes to get a cup of coffee. If you are worried about someone sitting down and showing the saved passwords, you've got far bigger problems from having an unsecured and unattended PC.
As for master passwords, they are a good tool, but don't put too much faith into them. A serious attacker that has the opportunity to go up against your master password has already gotten far enough to put in a keylogger. It's moderate protection against grab and run attacks on the database while the system is off though, and good protection against casual snoops, but it's not going to stop someone who's serious about getting your password from taking advantage of an unlocked PC.
In summary: